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SECRET [USNATO 2776]

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: ALLIES RETURN TO VERIFICATION

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

REF: A) USNATO 2566 B) USNATO 2440

SUMMARY: AT MAY 17 SPC MEETING ALLIES TOOK UP FIFTH REVISED DRAFT OF SPC'S VERIFICATION PAPER (TEXT REF A). ALTHOUGH CHAIRMAN SOUGHT TO PROMOTE PARA BY PARA REVIEW, EFFORT BROKE DOWN AT PARA 10 DUE TO GENERAL LACK OF INSTRUCTIONS AND SHARP DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON OVERT INSPECTION. FRG REP SOUGHT TO PORTRAY US RETICENCE ON NTM CAPABILITIES AS MAIN REASON FOR IMPASSE. SPC RETURNS TO SUBJECT MAY 21. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE ON SPECIFIC FRG AMENDMENTS TO VERIFICATION PAPER (SEE REF B), TOGETHER WITH ANY NEW US VIEWS ON DISTRIBUTION OF VERIFICATION TASK BETWEEN NTM AND OVERT INSPECTION. END SUMMARY

1. STRONG GERMAN EMPHASIS ON VERIFICATION BY NTM WAS HIGHLIGHTED IN SPC DISCUSSION OF FRG'S THIRD BRACKETED ALTERNATIVE IN PARA 5. BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) CHARACTERIZED PARA AS CRITICAL TO THE REST OF PAPER AS WELL AS TO ENTIRE CONCEPT OF OVERT VERIFICATION. ALTHOUGH FRG (RANTZAU) SAID NEW GERMAN LANGUAGE IN THIRD BRACKET WAS EFFORT TO ACCOMMODATE TO US POSITION, BELGIAN REP SAID IT PAPERED OVER THE BASIC QUESTION OF HOW MUCH INFORMATION US WOULD SHARE WITH ALLIES, AND WHETHER LATTER WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ITS SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS. THIS QUESTION NEEDED ANSWERING, GIVEN NEW FRG CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION. SINCE RESOLUTION OF QUESTION UNDERLYING PARA 5 WOULD AFFECT ALL OTHERS RELATED TO OVERT VERIFICATION IN SPC'S PAPER.

2. US REP ASKED WHETHER FRG REP INTERPRETED LAST SENTENCE OF NEW FRG BRACKET IN PAR 5 ("IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE ALLIES ARE DEPENDENT ON US") CORRECTLY. FRG REP ANSWERED THAT ALLIES ARE DEPENDENT ON US.

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WARSAW PACT COMPLIANCE WITH ANY MBFR AGREEMENT.")
 AS BEING INDEPENDENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM.
 FRG REP REPLIED THAT BONN DID INDEED SEE THAT JUDGMENT AS INDEPENDENT.
 HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT SINCE US HAD NOT SEEN FIT THUS FAR TO
 TELL ALLIES WHAT NTM CAN DO, FRG ASSUMED IT COULD DO "ANYTHING", AND
 WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD TO THIS ASSUMPTION UNTIL PROVEN WRONG.
 BASED ON THIS LOGIC, FRG SAW NO NEED FOR A GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM
 FOR POST REDUCTION MONITORING.
 3. AT A LATER JUNCTURE IN DISCUSSION, FRG REP SAID BASIC QUESTION
 IS WHAT FRG CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT IN TERMS OF AN OVERT INSPECTIO
 N
 SYSTEM, GIVEN THE STRONG POLITICAL LIABILITIES THAT BONN SEES IN
 SUCH A SYSTEM, TO REACH A FINAL JUDGMENT ON WHAT WOULD BE
 MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE, BONN WILL HAVE TO KNOW THE US POSITION ON:
 (A) THE NTM CAPABILITY QUESTION, AND (B), PROCEDURES THE US
 WOULD ENVISION FOR INFORMATION SHARING. UNTIL THESE PROBLEMS WERE
 RESOLVED NO FURTHER PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON SPC'S VERIFICATION
 PAPER.
 4. COMMENT: FRG ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT AMONG ALLIES FOR ITS
 EFFORTS TO LOOSEN UP US ATTITUDE TOWARDS NTM AND SOME SYMPATHY FOR
 THE POLITICAL PROBLEM BONN SEES IN OVERT INSPECTION MACHINERY.
 NONE OF ALLIES, HOWEVER, SEEM PREPARED TO CONCEDE AS MUCH ON OVERT
 INSPECTION AS FRG WISHES. ULTIMATE COMPROMISE WILL PROBABLY
 HAVE TO BE BASED ON SOME INDICATIONS OF HOW US WOULD SHARE
 INFORMATION DERIVED FROM NTM, EXPLANATION OF WHY OVERT INSPECTION
 IS TECHNICALLY DESIRABLE AS SUPPLEMENT TO OR AS ALTERNATIVE TO NTM
 AND SOME MODIFICATION IN OVERT SYSTEM PERHAPS ALONG LINES DISCUSSED
 IN USNATO 2440. SPC RESUMES DISCUSSIONS MAY 21 AND 24. END COMMENT.
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